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Recently, in conjunction with other research, I had occasion 
to work through two traditional grammarsl of Kurukh, a North Dravidian 
language. One was written at the turn of the century and one was writ-
ten about 1924. The authors were both missionaries and judging from 
their work had a traditional classical education. 
In considering these grammars, it is possible to say, as people 
often do, that the authors have "mixed" semantic and surface structure 
criteria in the ordering of their data •. When one says this, it is an 
imposition of a metric which does not seem to be present in their 
work. They, quite likely, assume only one level, not two. That is~ 
they believe in the 11 logic 11 of language and that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the surface structure and semantics. 
Only if one separates semantics and considers it as ~apped upon 
surface grammar does the lack of isomorphism of the two systems become 
clearly apparent. Having noted this, it becomes evident that from. 
time to time grammarians like those noted above, use first one, then 
the other criterion in doing their analysis. It depends, perhaps, 
upon which features are most striking in a given case. All of the 
time, they seem to believe themselves to be using only one criterion. 
It is quite apparent that the pre-structural view of grammar, as 
identical with logic, is at play, though I can't comment as to whether 
the investigator resolves the cases of inconsistency with himself or 
completely fails to see them in the frame of reference he is using. 
In general, however, the separating of the two systems tends 
to support a view of semantics and surface structure not bein~ iso-
morphic in every domain. Modern linguistics has long recognized 
this. Various 11 schools 11 have reacted to this recognition in a range 
of ways. 
On the one hand some, such as the neo-Bloomfieldians, concerned 
themselves primarily with finding a system of interralationships in 
the surface syntax. Though they recognized the level of semantics, 
they considered it to be an inaccessible "mental" entity which was 
not in their domain of endeavor. In their view it would behoove any-
one who tried to investigate semantics to get on with the proper 
business of linguistics. 
The endeavor to describe surface interrelationships eventually 
included an attempt to make broader connections over longer and 
longer utterance domains. This made necessary a search for deeper 
connections, since surface levels do not provide strong relations 
over those longer domains. 
It would appear that Chomsky's original plunge into generative 
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grammar was of this nature. He noted, in fact, in the introduction 
to The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theor~2 that his work was an 
outgrowth of his search for a satisfactory discourse-length syntax. 
He was truly in the tradition of neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics in that 
he avoided the mentalism of semantic considerations at all costs. In 
1955 and 1957 3 he made it clear that semantics was another enterprise, 
depending upon a satisfactory syntactic description. 
This venture of Chomsky's, however had the effect of moving lin-
guistics beyond the consideration of surface structure as the only 
object of linguistics inquiry. By gradual steps, the inquiry turned 
to sub-surface considerations to such an extent as to border upon 
neglect of surface realizations. The number of categories of the base 
component decreased. The complexity of the transformational component 
increased. Surface structure became less and less a constraint on 
the shape of the statements in the relational system. 
As this became more and more true, other constraints on the 
well-formedness of relational statements were brought to the fore, 
especially those psychological and physiological considerations having 
to do with the nervous sys tern, ·and the outer 1 imi ts of possible human 
utterance. Thus statements like, 11 All languages have recursive em-
bedding" can be justified on the basis of extra linguistic human factors 
This represented a break-through of sorts, subsuming a new domain under 
linguistic inquiry. 
However, research pushed the inquiry on to such abstraction that 
it became necessary to seek further constraints on deep structure. 
Without such constraints the elements and relations of the more ab-
stract base component had little reality, since the constraints of 
surface structure were relaxed. 
At that point a jump to the considerations of semantics was 
possible. With the deep connections thus given a new interpretation, 
(that is a semantic one), investigation of their structure opened a 
new domain in which to search for isomorphism. While it was more 
tenuous than overt grammar, it was certainly a more satisfying enter-
prise than reliance on the very distant surface syntax. If the struc-
ture of semantics could be found in any sense, it was, by the nature 
of its interconnections, the relations underlying spoken language. 
This jump thus provided additional ways to investigate these connections. 
Before, there '~ere only surface syntactic considerations, along with 
relatively ill-defined biological outer limits, to provide constraints 
on the shape of deep grammar relational statements. Now these must 
correspond with what we know or can discover of the underlying sem-
antics, or cognition, of the speakers. This has, in some sense, roots 
in the speaker's world view. 
A new question is opened, however. The jump to semantics was 
made within the context of formal logic. Various attempts to modify 
formal logic have been proposed, McCawley's 4 , for example. But there 
are underlying assumptions involved, for example, that something 
closely akin to formal logic will suffice to describe, say the world-
view of the speaker. Additionally, the common American linguistic 
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assumption of the additive nature of the lexical value of morphs is taken without question. 
We can note that semantic inquiry, say of Goodenough, Morris, 
and Osgood, has taken a good many different forms, depending upon 
the background of the investigator. We then might look at the current enterprise. 
It would appear that the present shape of semantic inquiry by linguists may be an accident of its history, not a necessary form. 
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